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Essay
Secondary Human Rights Law
Monica Hakimit

I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the United States has appeared before four different
treaty bodies to defend its human rights record. 1 The process is part of the
human rights enforcement structure: each of the major universal treaties has
an expert body that reviews and comments on compliance reports that states
must periodically submit. 2 What's striking about the treaty bodies' dialogues
with the United States is not that they criticized it or disagreed with it on the
content of certain substantive rules. (That was all expected.) It's the extent to
which the two sides talked past each other. Each presumed a different set of
secondary rules-rules governing how and by whom human rights law may
be made, applied, and enforced3-so their arguments on substance appeared
irresolvable.
Here is a fairly typical example: The committee that oversees the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) interprets that
instrument to contain a rule on refoulement. 4 The committee also understands
its interpretations to be, in some way, authoritative. 5 During the report-andcomment process, the United States contested both points. It argued, first, that
the ICCPR has no rule on refoulement, and, second, that the ICCPR
committee has no authority to establish one. 6 Substance and process were
intertwined. The disagreement on whether the ICCPR regulates refoulement
could not be resolved without defining the nature of the lawmaking process-

t
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Karima
Bennoune, Jacob Katz Cogan, Steven Ratner, Bruno Simma, and Brian Simpson for helpful comments
on earlier drafts.
I.
For related documents, see Office of the High Comm 'r for Human Rights (Treaty Bodies
Database), http://tb.ohchr.org/default.aspx (enter "United States of America" for Country) (last visited
Mar. 31, 2009).
2.
See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 40, Dec. 16, 1966, S.
EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR).
3.
On secondary rules, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-99 (2d ed. 1994).
4.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 20, ,i 9 (1992), reprinted in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty
Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. l, at 30 (July 29, 1994) [hereinafter ICCPR General Comment No.
20).
5.
See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights
Committee: United States ofAmerica,~ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USNC0/3/Rev.l (Dec. 18, 2006); infra
note 20 and accompanying text.
6.
See U.N. Human Rights Comm., Comments by the Government of the United States of
America on the Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, at 8-11, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/USNC0/3/ Rev. I/Add. I (Feb. 12, 2008).
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and specifically what weight (if any) to give the ICCPR committee's
prescriptive claims.
The U.S. approach might be dismissed as idiosyncratic. In fact, it
reflects a deep tension in human rights law and illuminates the lack of
consensus on many of the applicable secondary rules. The problem initially
appears resolvable bi reference to the secondary rules that govern other areas
of international law. At its core, the human rights system is structured much
like other international regimes. States are principal actors. They sometimes
prescribe law by treaty. The treaties contain substantive rules of conduct and
establish international monitoring bodies. Beyond that core, however, the
structure of the human rights system has taken particular shape. States-the
traditional prescribers and enforcers of international law-designed a system
that is weak. Treaty-based rules of conduct are typically ambiguous 8 and
sometimes inoperative. 9 And treaty monitoring bodies lack formal authority to
"harden" those rules through conclusive interpretations or adjudications of
wrongdoing. That framework-soft substantive rules with decisionmaking
authority largely in state hands-discords with the system's operational
norms. In practice, treaty bodies and other nonstate actors claim considerable
authority to specify and enforce treaty-based rules. The breadth of that
disconnect between the formal framework established by states and the
informal, operative norms sows confusion on which secondary rules govern.
The lack of consensus on the applicable secondary rules strains the
human rights system. First, it inhibits the system's capacity to specify
substantive rules of conduct. Without defining the processes for making law
and distinguishing it from mere aspirations, the system cannot resolve what
the law requires. Second, the lack of consensus breeds dissidence within the
system, as international actors regularly invoke and enforce their version of
law without acknowledging conflicting versions and without resolution on
which version is authoritative. This Essay calls attention to that problem and
seeks to initiate a conversation on how best to mitigate it. Throughout, I draw
on the jurisprudential insights of my mentor and friend, Professor Michael
Reisman. For those and many other insights, I honor him with this Essay.
Two stage-setting notes: First, I focus in this Essay on the secondary
rules in human rights law. Human rights law may not be the only international
regime with specialized secondary rules, 10 but it probably is unique in the
degree to which those rules are contested. Second, the legal process on human
rights is extraordinarily complex. In this Essay, I paint with a broad brush,
erasing some nuance in order to address the system as a whole. Because I

7.
On the difficulties of applying in human rights law the same secondary rules that govern
other areas of international law, see Bruno Simma, International Human Rights and General

International Law: A Comparative Analysis, in

IV-2 COLLECTED COURSES OF THE ACADEMY OF

153 (1993).
8.
See infra Section II.A.
9.
See infra Section II.B.
10.
See, e.g., Daniel Bodansky, Does One Need To Be an International Lawyer To Be an
International Environmental Lawyer?, 100 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 303 (2006) (arguing that
international environmental law has specialized secondary rules).
EUROPEAN LAW
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focus on the universal human rights system, I exclude from discussion the
various regional ones. 11
IL

A.

WHICH SECONDARY RULES?

Rules for Lawmaking

Professor Reisman has theorized that, to make law, decisionmakers must
establish communal expectations along three axes: (1) on the policy content of
a norm; (2) that those who prescribe it have the authority to do so; and (3) that
it will be enforced. 12 States sometimes establish those expectations-and
therefore make law-by treaty. Yet human rights treaties typically establish
only baseline expectations on their policy content because they define their
rules in amorphous or contextually variable terms. For example, the ICCPR
prohibits "arbitrary" detentions without defining arbitrariness. 13 The
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDA W) requires states to take "appropriate" measures to suppress
trafficking of women, but it does not specify what measures are appropriate. 14
Because treaty-based rules are often open-ended, they require further
prescription to obtain robust, shared meanings. States occasionally do that
when they interpret, apply, or enforce the rules. 15 In practice, however, those
functions are largely performed by an amalgamation of nonstate actors that
technically lack prescriptive authority. For ease of reference, I call these
actors-treaty bodies, NGOs, scholars, and U.N. experts and officials"human rights actors." There are important differences among them, but, as a
group, they are extraordinarily active in trying to harden the human rights
system. That entails a prescriptive function because it requires giving content
to otherwise amorphous treaty-based rules.
So might human rights actors have some prescriptive authority in the
form of interpretation or specification? 16 The answer at one extreme is that
they do not, unless states expressly delegate it to them. 17 (In the universal
system, this means they do not.) According to this approach, human rights law
is like other international law that is made by state consent. If states consent
only to amorphous rules, so be it. Those rules must be specified through
11.
The regional system in Europe is especially distinct. For an overview, see D.J. HARRIS ET
AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (2006).
12.
W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, 75 AM.
Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. IOI, 108 (1981).
13.
JCCPR, supra note 2, art. 9.
14.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women art. 6,
Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW).
15.
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 61/143, U.N. Doc. NRES/61/143 (Jan. 30, 2007) (specifying state
obligations on violence against women); U.S. Dep't of State, Human Rights Country Reports,
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt (applying treaty-based norms to assess other states' human rights
practices) (last visited Mar. 31, 2009).
16.
This authority may appear insubstantial, but for amorphous treaty-based rules it is often
the entire game.
17. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Summary Record of the 2380th Meeting, ,i 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/SR.2380 (July 27, 2006) ("[O)nly the parties to a treaty were empowered to give a
binding interpretation of its provisions unless the treaty provided otherwise."); Andrew T. Guzman &
Jennifer Landsidle, The Myth of International Delegation, 96 CAL. L. REv. 1693, 1706-07 (2008).
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subsequent state action. As a practical matter, this approach frustrates efforts
to establish robust rules of conduct because many states have not and will not
consent to them. The "unpleasant implication," in Martti Koskenniemi's
words, is that "people have human rights only so far as actually accepted by
states." 18
At the opposite extreme, human rights actors claim considerable
prescriptive authority, irrespective of state consent. Those who take this
approach are usually more subtle. Human rights actors claim interpretive
(rather than prescriptive) authority; they then adopt aggressive interpretations
and treat those interpretations as dispositive. 19 The ICCPR committee has
claimed that states must accept its interpretive authoriq; and that reservations
incompatible with its interpretations could be severed. 0 Human rights actors
adopt this same approach when citing each other's interpretations as law. 21
For instance, treaty texts are ambiguous on the extent to which they prohibit
corporal punishment. 22 Many states practice and accept certain forms of
corporal punishment, 23 but various human rights actors assert that it is
prohibited absolutely. 24 They cite each other's assertions as evidence oflaw. 25
Those two approaches define the extremes, but they reveal a lack of
consensus on the process for making human rights law. Each approach
purports to shield lawmaking from large groups of relevant actors. The stateconsent position sidelines human rights actors. Many of these actors are
deeply committed to advancing human rights; they will not accept the law
established by states unless they believe it satisfies their substantive
interests. 26 The opposite position tries to circumvent recalcitrant states, and
18.
Martti Koskenniemi, The Pull of the Mainstream, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1946, 1951 (1990).
19.
A prevalent but watered down variant of this approach asserts that treaty-body
pronouncements are in some way authoritative. See, e.g., Michael O'Flaherty, The Concluding
Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, 6 HUM. RTS. L. R.Ev. 27, 32-37 (2006)
(collecting views of high-profile human rights actors).
20.
U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 24, ,r,r 11, 18, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/
Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 4, 1994).
21.
For an early criticism of this "myopic and incestuous" trend in the human rights literature,
see Philip Alston, Making Space for New Human Rights: The Case of the Right to Development, I
HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 3, 8-11 (1988).
22.
For relevant treaty texts, see ICCPR, supra note 2, art. 7; Convention on the Rights of the
Child arts. 19, 37, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment arts. I, 16, Dec. IO, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 10020, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. For a more detailed discussion, see NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF
PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 309-24 (2d ed. 1999).
23.
See, e.g., Comm. on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8, U.N. Doc.
CRC/C/GC/8 (Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter CRC Comment No. 8] (noting widespread practice and
acceptance).
24.
See ICCPR General Comment No. 20, supra note 4, ,r 5; CRC Comment No. 8, supra note
23; see also Karima Bennoune, "A Practice Which Debases Everyone Involved": Corporal Punishment
Under International Law, in 20 ANS CONSACR.ES A LA REALISATION D'UNE [DEE 203 (1997).
25.
See, e.g., Amnesty Int'!, Corporal Punishment, in FAIR TRIALS MANUAL, available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/internationaljustice/fair_trials/manual/25.htrnl (last visited Mar. 30, 2009);
Letter from Alice Farmer, Aryeh Neier Fellow, Human Rights Watch, to Delmer C. Stamps, President,
Jackson Pub. Sch. Dist. Bd. ofTrs. (Mar. 26, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/03/
26/do-not-reinstate-corporal-punishment-schools.
26.
See W. Michael Reisman, On the Causes of Uncertainty and Volatility in International
Law, in THE SHIITING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33, 36-42 (Tomer Broude &
Yuval Shany eds., 2008).
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sometimes the reactionary groups that operate within them. This approach,
too, is unsustainable. States are unlikely to treat as law the norms advanced by
human rights actors if states believe the norms are illegitimate, 27 or face
domestic pressure not to comply. 28
B.

Rules for Law-Finding

Separately, there is confusion on the rules for finding human rights law.
At first glance, these may appear the same as the rules for making law. Once
the prescriptive process is defined, what comes out of it presumably is law.
But in the human rights system, some of that output is decidedly not law. In
other words, decisionmakers may choose not to establish operative
prescriptions, even when they use the prescriptive process and communicate
in legal form. 29 That is nothing new. Human rights treaties go through an
accepted prescriptive process but are widely understood to be part
aspirational. 30 The difficulty is identifying which provisions constitute law,
and which reflect aspirations.
Returning to Professor Reisman' s framework, law is accompanied by
expectations of authority and control-that those who prescribed the norms
had authority to do so, and that the norms will be enforced.31 Law thus is
distinguishable from aspirations by the signals of authority and control that
attach to it. Those signals are muddied in the human rights system. First,
authority signals sometimes attach to mere aspirations. To use the example
from above, treaties contain aspirations that appear authoritative because
expressed in the form of law. Second, control signals are often weak or
inconsistent. The system has long tolerated high levels of noncompliance,
which means that legally operative norms are poorly enforced. The kicker is
that aspirations are sometimes also enforced. (One modus operandi among
human rights actors is to enforce aspirations as if they were law.) I elaborate
on the enforcement process in the next Section. At this point, I underscore
that, because authority and control signals are muddied, norms that are
intended to be aspirational may appear authoritative or controlling, and legally
operative norms may appear noncontrolling. That complicates efforts to
distinguish between the two. Some interpret the muddied signals to mean that
most human-rights-related declarations are law; others draw the opposite
conclusion. 32 No shared rules exist to resolve the issue.
27.

Id. On the importance on perceived legitimacy in inducing compliance, see TOM R.

TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW

161-78 (1990).

See Simma, supra note 7, at 167.
See Reisman, supra note 26, at 43.
See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and
Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 399,457 (2000); Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez,
Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal law, 93 CAL. L. REV. 75, 89 (2005).
31. See Reisman, supra note 26, at 34-35 ("Legal communications are distinguished from the
28.
29.
30.

daily bombardment of 'you-shoulds' and 'you-oughts' by the symbols of authority and commitments of
control that attend to them."); Reisman, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
32. This has long been a problem for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights. See International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16,
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. Some actors assert that the Covenant's provisions constitute law, but others
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Rules for Law-Enforcing

Finally, there is disagreement on the rules governing enforcement-on
the appropriate processes for adjudicating and then sanctioning instances of
wrongdoing. Many of the classic international mechanisms for enforcement
(e.g., treaty suspension and tit-for-tat countermeasures) are premised on
reciprocity. 33 But human rights law is not structured around a reciprocal
exchange of rights and obligations. States have only erratic incentive to police
each other's conduct. And even when they do, the proper remedy for a
violation is not to allow other states to also violate rights.
The human rights system has responded by developing its own
enforcement mechanisms. The mechanisms under the universal treaties are the
report-and-comment process and, for some parties to some treaties, the
consideration of individual petitions. Neither is binding. Treaty bodies review
state conduct but lack authority to decide conclusively that a state has violated
the law or to penalize it if it has. Yet here again treaty bodies claim
authority-this time, enforcement authority-beyond what is specifically
34
delegated to them. For example, most have made the report-and-comment
process more robust by inviting NGOs to submit shadow reports on state
35
practices, and by developinif follow-up procedures that pressure states to
comply with their comments. 3
Outside the treaty process, international actors have developed more
informal enforcement tools: fact-finding and naming-and-shaming devices,
the suspension of assistance programs, support for local activist groups, suits
in domestic courts, and so on. These tools often sting more than the ones
envisioned in the treaty texts, but they are disjointedly employed.
The question is whether all of those tools are legitimate. Even if they
are, might they become illegitimate because applied inconsistently or by
particular actors? Some may find these questions curious. They expect human
rights rules to be enforced whenever possible and through whatever means
available. Yet international law has long regulated enforcement jurisdiction.
Many states assert that enforcement in the human rights system has become
understand them to be mostly aspirational. See, e.g., Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart,
Justiciability of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights: Should There Be an International Complaints
Mechanism To Adjudicate the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 462,465
(2004).
33. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 60, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679 (on suspension); Int'! Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 43, U.N. Doc. N56/IO (2001),
reprinted in (2001] 2 Y.B. Int'! L. Comm'n pt. 2, at 20, U.N. Doc. NCN.4/SER.N2001/Add.l (on
countermeasures).
34. See Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA.
L. REv. 171, 229-35 (2008); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 343-45 ( 1997).
35. See, e.g., OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE UNITED
NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CORE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
AND THE TREATY BODIES (2005), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/OHCHR
-FactSheet30.pdf.
36. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Comm., Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights
Committee, R. 101, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/3/Rev.8 (Sept. 22, 2005).
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overly "confrontational" or "politicized." 37 They argue for a more
"cooperative" enforcement model. 38 Moreover, some try to channel
enforcement to formal bodies that specialize in human rights but are relatively
ineffective. 39 My point is not that these efforts are right or wrong, but that they
reflect discontent on the operative enforcement process in human rights law.
Ill.

ASSESSING THE DISCORDANCE

On some level, the discordance on the applicable secondary rules is
inevitable. International actors have different visions for and levels of
commitment to the human rights system, and they seek secondary rules that
satisfy their policy preferences. Many states desire only a weak human rights
40
system so reject secondary rules that make it more robust. By contrast,
human rights actors typically demand meaningful substantive standards with
enforcement teeth. They insist on secondary rules that satisfy that demand.
Because substance and process are intertwined, each actor has a short-term
interest in assuming secondary rules that bolster its immediate policy
preferences.
But the discordance also takes a toll. First, it cultivates uncertainty on
the content of many substantive rules. Such uncertainty is fairly common. For
example, is corporal punishment prohibited absolutely?41 What, if anything,
must states do to displace religious practices that undermine women's
rights?42 These questions will continue to yield inconsistent answers, so long
as the governing secondary rules themselves are indeterminate. Without
resolving how law may be made or distinguished from surrounding
aspirations, the system cannot resolve what the law requires. 43
37. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, Apr. 19-May 7, 1993, The Cairo
Declaration on Human Rights in Islam, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.18 (June 9, 1993)
(hereinafter Cairo Declaration); Comm. Against Torture, Comments by China, at 2, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/CHN/C0/4/Add. l (Dec. 17, 2008); see also Felice D. Gaer, A Voice Not an Echo: Universal
Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System, 7 HUM. RTS. L. R.Ev. 109, 128-33 (2007) (reviewing
impetus for cooperative approach in U.N. Human Rights Council).
38.
See sources cited supra note 37.
39. See, e.g., U.N. SCOR, 62d Sess., 5619th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.5619 (Jan. 12, 2007)
(debate and vote rejecting draft resolution on human rights in Myanmar).
40.
For example, proposals to establish a "World Court of Human Rights" have circulated for
decades, but states have not pursued them. See Jochen von Bemstorff, The Changing Fortunes of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Genesis and Symbolic Dimensions of the Turn to Rights in
International law, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 903, 921 (2008).
41. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
42. Compare CEDAW, supra note 14, arts. 2(f), 5(a) (requiring states to address such
practices), and U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28, ,i 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.lO (Mar. 29, 2000) (reiterating that obligation), with Comm. on the Elimination
of Discrimination Against Women, Declarations, Reservations, Objections and Notifications of
Withdrawal of Reservations Relating to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/SP/2006/2 (Apr. 10, 2006) (collecting reservations
designed to preserve such practices), and Org. of the Islamic Conference, Final Communique of the
Eleventh Session of the Islamic Summit Conference, ~,i 105, 112, Doc. No. OIC/SUMMIT11/2008/FC/Final (Mar. 13-14, 2008) (hereinafter OIC 2008 Communique] (reaffirming "the right of
States to adhere to their religious, social, and cultural specificities," and calling for a "Covenant on
Women's Right in Islam").
43. See HART, supra note 3, at 92-93.
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Uncertainty on the substantive content of law is undesirable, but it is
inherent in any system in which law is fuzzy or unsettled. The second and
more troubling problem in the human rights system is that international actors
often fail to acknowledge the extent to which the law is, in fact, indeterminate.
Once they presume an applicable set of secondary rules, they apply those rules
to derive what they consider to be law. Conflicting versions of law-those
derived by applying different secondary rules-are not acknowledged and
engaged, but rather dismissed as mere posturing. That problem is then
exacerbated at the stage of application and enforcement. Decisionmakers
inevitably invoke only one version of law. 44 To actors that believe in
conflicting versions, the one invoked appears wrong or illegitimate. This is
especially likely where the decisionmaker lacks formal enforcement authority
or uses enforcement tools that themselves are considered illegitimate.
In the long term, that dynamic is likely to breed dissidence within the
human rights system. States are unlikely to comply with new standards that
they reject outright. 45 Actors and audiences that believe those standards
constitute law may find that reality unsettling and eventually may lose faith in
the efficacy of law to advance human rights. 46 Over and over again, they
observe states disregard (without repercussion) what they understand to be
law. Paradoxically, some may respond by engaging in the very conduct that
caused their disillusionment in the first place. If states disregard law, then it is
of little consequence, so they may as well invoke and enforce norms
irrespective of whether the norms have legal footing.
For a variety reasons, states may also become dissatisfied. Anecdotal
evidence indicates that some states believe the system has become overly
politicized or illegitimate-that the norms being invoked and enforced are not
legal norms and improperly reflect interest-group capture. 47 Other states may
perceive the system to be unbalanced because insufficiently accommodating
of competing interests. 48 Still others may contest the apparent double standard
in application and enforcement. 49 Regardless of their reason, states that
believe the system no longer fulfills their interests will have little reason to
maintain it and may agitate against it. 50

44.
On the problem of international fora applying different versions of law, see W. Michael
Reisman, The Democratization of Contemporary International Law-Making Processes and the
Differentiation of Their Application, in DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 15,
24-29 (Riidiger Wolfrum & Volker Rohen eds., 2005).
45.
See Simma, supra note 7, at 167.
46.
See Reisman, supra note 44, at 29.
47.
For example, the Organization of the Islamic Conference has signaled that, in its view,
many human rights norms have been captured by Western interests and inadequately reflect Islamic
interests. See, e.g., OIC 2008 Communique, supra note 42, 11105-13; Cairo Declaration, supra note 37.
48.
For example, several Western democracies have recently challenged or evaded
interpretations advanced by human rights actors in order to satisfy counterterrorism interests. See
Monica Hakimi, International Standards for Detaining Terrorism Suspects: Moving Beyond the Armed
Conflict-Criminal Divide, 33 YALE J. INT'L L. 369, 395-407 (2008).
49.
On the problem of inconsistent enforcement, see Christof Heyns & Frans Viljoen, The
Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level, 23 HUM. RTS. Q. 483, 48889 (2001).
50.
Reisman, supra note 26, at 36.
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CONCLUSION

The discordance on the applicable secondary rules strains the human
rights system. This Essay calls attention to that problem and urges
international actors and law scholars to respond. That requires different things
in different contexts. At the very least, it requires taking the communicative
process seriously-acknowledging opposing views, having meaningful
dialogues to establish shared expectations, and at times compromising one's
immediate policy preferences in favor of systemic coherence. That will not be
easy, and it will not resolve all human-rights-related disputes. But if the
processes for making, finding, and enforcing human rights law degenerate, so
too may the human rights system itself.

